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IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT NASHVILLE 
Ronald Pool, 
Employee, 
v. 
Jarmon D&Q Transport, 
Employer, 
And 
Riverport Insurance Company, 
Carrier. 
) Docket No.: 2015-06-0510 
) 
) State File Number: 48782-2015 
) 
) Chief Judge Kenneth M. Switzer 
) 
) 
) 
EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER ON REMAND 
This cause came before the undersigned workers' compensation judge upon 
remand from the Board of Appeals for the sole determination of whether the Employee, 
Ronald Pool, provided timely notice of his alleged occupational disease under Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-305 (2015). The Court also notes that the Board of 
Appeals commented on its poor phraseology on the "right" to a causation opinion. The 
Court, after determining no need for additional proof, reviewed the expedited hearing 
record and finds that Mr. Pool satisfied his burden to show he provided sufficient notice 
of his alleged occupational disease to the Employer, Jarmon D&Q Transport. 
Analysis 
The Workers' Compensation Law provides: "Within thirty (30) days after the first 
distinct manifestation of an occupational disease, the employee, or someone in the 
employee's behalf, shall give written notice thereof to the employer in the same manner 
as is provided in the case of a compensable accidental injury." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
305(a) (2015) (emphasis added). 
In Christopher v. Consolidation Coal Co., 440 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1969), the 
Supreme Court specifically interpreted the meaning of the phrase "after the first distinct 
manifestation of the occupational disease of the employee." Referring to previous 
Tennessee cases, the Court generally concluded if, for the purposes of notice to the 
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employer, there were any doubt about whether a disease was "occupational," there is no 
distinct manifestation until it reaches a point where a doctor would diagnose it as an 
occupational disease. !d. at 285; see Greener v. E.!. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 219 
S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tenn. 1949) and Wilson v. Van Buren County, 268 S.W.2d 363, 367 
(Tenn. 1954). 
Further, the Christopher Court cited with approval a Maryland Court of Appeals 1 
decision interpreting the term "manifest" in an almost identical statute as follows: 
Clear, plain, evident, manifest, obvious, patent, palpable, unmistakable, 
conspicuous, and says: 'What is clear can be seen without dimness; what is 
plain can be seen by anyone at the first glance without search or study; 
evident suggests something more of a mental process but no difficulty in 
seeing that the thing is true; manifest is a degree stronger than evident, the 
mind getting the truth as by an intuition.' No doubt the legislators used the 
word manifestation with something of this significance, intending that the 
duty of giving notice, and the risk that an employee might forfeit 
compensation for an occupational disease, should arise only when a 
symptom[ s] of that disease should plainly appear, not when it was merely 
suspected or doubtful. 
Christopher, 440 S.W.2d at 286. 
!d. 
The Court additionally quoted with approval the following language: 
We agree that the words of the statute now in question mean in the case 
now before us that limitations as to notice to the employer, and as to the 
time of filing of the claim . . . started to run in this occupational disease 
case from the time the employee or some one in his behalf knew or had 
reason to believe that he was suffering from an occupational disease and 
that there was a causal connection between his disability and occupation[.] 
Mr. Pool testified by phone and submitted an affidavit in support of his claim. He 
wrote: "Some time at the end of 2014 and January of 2015 I started having Upper 
Respiratory problems from mold in the vehicles at work. At that time I had no 
understanding about Mold Sickness and how to understand the symptoms." (Ex. 3 at 4.) 
In February 2015, the Montgomery County Health Department diagnosed him with 
asthma. !d. at 5. Mr. Pool sought further treatment in March, including a lung x-ray. !d. 
at 6. In April 2015, the Emergency Room at Gateway Medical Center diagnosed him 
1 This is the Court of last resort in Maryland. 
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with pneumonia and cardiac risk factors. !d. At this point, Mr. Pool "started to get 
curious" regarding his symptoms. !d. He decided to conduct mold testing on his own. 
!d. at 7. On May 1, 2015, Mr. Pool performed an indoor air quality test in a particular 
van and in a few days observed mold growths. !d. On June 4, 2015, according to Mr. 
Pool, a triage nurse at the Montgomery County Health advised "there was no yeast or 
mold isolated after 4 weeks." !d. at 8. From June 7-9, 2015, he performed air quality 
tests on van #13 and #20. !d. On June 25, he presented his immediate supervisor with 
two petri dishes with mold growth. !d. at 9. 
At this point, the Court adopts the Board of Appeals' opinion regarding the factual 
history. 
Employee testified that on June 25, 2015, he "sought help from my 
immediate supervisor Tim Hembree," telling him that he "required medical 
treatment with a workers' compensation doctor." According to Employee, 
"I brought to his attention evidence of mold in a petri tray and - in petri 
trays and results that I had from my investigation on the vehicle that I was 
hired to work in." Employer completed a First Report of Work Injury on 
the same date, which described how the "injury" occurred as follows: 
"[Employee] came to the supervisor with mold samples that he got from the 
vans that is causing [Employee] an allergic reaction to sinus area." 
Employer provided a panel of physicians on June 25, 2015, and Employee 
was seen the following day by Dr. Giriprasadarao Korivi, whom Employee 
selected from the panel. The history of present illness in Dr. Korivi's June 
26, 2015 report states that Employee "has had recurrent 'sinus problems' 
[and] sinus infections off and on," and notes that Employee "feels fine 
when he is not working." The report states that Employee "says it is an 
indoor air quality issue at work and is causing his allergies and repeated 
sinus infections." Employee was diagnosed at the June 26, 2015 visit with 
"[a]llergic rhinitis, cause unspecified." The assessment states "[w]orker in 
work-related accident," and includes an "allergy & immunology referral." 
Employee was released to work, but was instructed to "[a]void allergen 
exposure." 
Employer offered a panel of allergists on July 2, 2015, from which 
Employee chose Dr. John Overholt. Before Employee could see Dr. 
Overholt, Employer denied the claim on July 7, 2015, stating in a letter to 
Employee that his claim was not compensable due to a "[l]ack of [i]njury as 
defined by [Tennessee Code Annotated] Section 50-6-301." 
The Appeals Board in McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing explained: 
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An employee need not prove each and every element of his or her claim by 
a preponderance of the evidence at an expedited hearing to be entitled to 
temporary disability or medical benefits, but must instead present evidence 
sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the employee would likely 
prevail at a hearing on the merits in accordance with the express terms of 
section 50-6-239(d)(1). A contrary rule would require many injured 
workers to seek out, obtain, and pay for a medical evaluation or treatment 
before his or her employer would have any obligation to provide medical 
benefits. The delays inherent in such an approach, not to mention the cost 
barrier for many workers, would be inconsistent with a fair, expeditious, 
and efficient workers' compensation system. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-
1409(b)(2)(A) (2014). Moreover, we note that since an expedited hearing 
is interlocutory in nature, either party may present additional evidence at 
the final compensation hearing and ask the trial court to reverse or modify 
the interlocutory order. 
McCord v. Advantage. Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9-10 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
Therefore, upon the limited scope of this remand, the Court finds that Mr. Poole 
provided notice of a potential work-related injury within the timeframe required by 
section 50-6-305. That section sets a deadline for providing notice to an employer of an 
occupational disease based upon "the first distinct manifestation" of same. Based on the 
case law cited above, Mr. Poole provided notice even before the first distinct 
manifestation occurred, and is therefore entitled to medical benefits. For the same 
reasons set forth in the original opinion, Mr. Poole is entitled to treatment from Dr. John 
Overholt, previously selected from a panel provided by Jarmon. 
Consistent with the comments from the Board in its last paragraph of the remand, 
the Court acknowledges that a statement of causation from Dr. Overholt or other medical 
experts is the responsibility of the parties to obtain. The Court merely orders the 
initiation of, or, in this case, the continuation of medical benefits. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Jarmon or its workers' compensation carrier shall authorize medical treatment by 
Dr. John Overholt for Mr. Pool's injuries as required by Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-204 (20 15). Mr. Pool shall furnish medical bills relative 
to the authorized provider's treatment to Jarmon or its workers' compensation 
carrter. 
2. This matter is re-set for an Initial (Scheduling) Hearing on March 1, 2016, at 2:45 
p.m. 
ENTERED this the 13th day of January, 2016. 
Initial (Scheduling) Hearing: 
euneth M. Switze'r, Chief Jud e 
Court of Workers' Compensati 
An Initial (Scheduling) Hearing has been set with Chief Judge Kenneth M. 
Switzer, Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. You must call 615-532-9552 or 
toll-free at 866-943-0025 to participate in the Initial Hearing. 
Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation. 
Right to Appeal: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the 
date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
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4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be 
made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of 
Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
5. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within 
twenty days of filing the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal, specifying the 
issues presented for review and including any argument in support thereof. A 
party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if any, with the Court Clerk within 
five business days of the filing of the appellant's position statement. All position 
statements pertaining to an appeal of an interlocutory order should include: (1) a 
statement summarizing the facts of the case from the evidence admitted during the 
expedited hearing; (2) a statement summarizing the disposition of the case as a 
result of the expedited hearing; (3) a statement of the issue(s) presented for 
review; and (4) an argument, citing appropriate statutes, case law, or other 
authority. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order on 
Remand was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this 
the 13th day of January, 2016. 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Ronald Pool, X 
Self-represented 
Duane Willis, 
Employer's Counsel 
Via Via Service sent to: 
Fax Email 
X ronaldleepool@aol.com 
X dwillis@morganakins.com 
&s m~~rt 
Court o' orkers' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
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